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This thesis was directed toward understanding the problem
of Navy career enlisted retention. The thesis develops a
statistical model to explain past Navy career retention rates,
and to predict future career retention rates in the Navy. The
statistical model utilizes economic variables as predictors.
The model developed has a high correlation with Navy career
retention rates. The problem of Navy career retention has not
been adequately studied, and this thesis provides an initial
examination of this area. The retention decisions are based
upon economic variables. The findings indicate Navy policy-
makers must be cognizant of the relationships of economic
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a statistical
model of retention behavior of the Navy's career enlisted
personnel. These personnel are extremely important to the
Navy because of their high levels of training and operational
expertise. Very few formal studies have been discovered
that address this subject area. For instance, Wool £lj in
his chapter on retention references a few studies on careerist
retention, but focuses on the reenlistment decisions of
first-term enlisted personnel.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , Admiral Thomas B.
Hayward in an interview with All Hands [2Jj , stated:
Absolutely, for the most part; although not exclusively,
the solution to the loss of so many of our best people
is money. Too many Navy men and women are just not being
adequately compensated for the demanding and highly
professional jobs which our country calls upon them to
do. No one should expect to have to add the strain of
making ends meet to the other demands which Navy life
puts upon our people and their families . .
.
Although the Admiral's position is not universally popular
within the Carter Administration, it is supported by others
inside and outside the Defense Establishment. The April
1978, Report of the President's Commission on Military
Compensation f"3~J , stated:
Since the switch to an All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the
nation's supply of military manpower has become more
dependent on the conditions of the labor market place . .
.
to attract and retain personnel, changes in compensation
policies and personnel management became necessary to




Additionally, before the House Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, Robert B. Pirie £ 4 J testified
that:
No matter how much our service people may want to make a
career of the military, I feel that we may be reaching a
point where they will not be able to afford to remain in
the service.
The evidence of several studies and evaluations made
in recent months clearly support the fact that the military
personnel have not shared equally in the growth of salaries
and wages experienced by other segments of the American
economy.
If we are to attract and retain young Americans to the
military, we must act positively to reverse both the
reality and the perception of the past decade.
We must make the compensation system for military
service such that our people perceive them as, at least,
not a financial burden and, better still, competitive
with the civilian economy.
Military pay increases must continue to be linked to
private sector pay increases . .
.
The above views contrast very sharply with the Defense Man-
power Commission £ 5 J which in its April 1976 report to the
President, wrote:
There is something to military service beyond pay and
benefits; one serves regardless of recognition or
appreciation. If this were not so, the professional
armed forces of the western democracies would not have
survived the period between the wars. In short, true
professionals will serve and fight, even if they believe
they are being neglected. ...
The former views indicate that the most important factors
in the retention of high quality manpower, in the era of the
All-Volunteer Force, are pay and the other factors of
compensation. What this implies is that the modern military
10

man is very much aware of the economic aspects of his
employment and bases his decision whether to remain in the
service in large measure on those economic factors.
The focus of this thesis is upon the career enlisted
fraction of the Navy's manpower. The careerists for the
purposes of this thesis will be defined as those personnel
who have completed seven (7) years of service (YOS) . These
personnel, when making a retention decision, will be making
that decision for the second or greater number of times £ 6 J .
Defining careerist narrowly permits the thesis to focus
upon a fraction of Navy manpower that is very vital to the
Navy if it is to continue to be a strong service.
This thesis assumes the position of The President's
Commission on Military Compensation. Specifically, it is
assumed that, when faced with a decision concerning leaving
the Naval Service each career enlisted man will compare the
value of his present compensation and that of the appropriate
civilian alternative. After making comparison with the values
of the alternatives, the service member will choose the one
with the highest present value.
Given the above assumptions, the potential career
reenlistee may determine wages and other economic factors,
i.e., a reservation wage, RMC and other benefits that would
make the sum of the benefits of becoming a civilian just
equal to the benefits of remaining in the military. At this
wage and benefit combination, W* , the potential career
11

reenlistee would be indifferent between reenlistment and
becoming a civilian. If the military compensation package,
Wo, actually available to the potential career reenlistee
exceeded his reservation wage , then he or she would reenlist
If the reservation wage was greater than Wo, then he or she
would not remain in the service. References 7 and 8 give an
excellent explanation of the behavior of individuals in the
evaluation of the economic factors of employment.
There exists among the potential career reenlistees
wide personal differences in reservation wages. Such
differences result from the varying opportunity costs of
reenlisting and perceived differences in the non-monetized
aspects of continued military service. For example, a
potential career reenlistee (careerist) with excellent
civilian opportunities and poor taste for continued military
service will, ceteris parabus
,
possess a high reservation
wage. The potential careerists could be arrayed in a
frequency distribution according to their reservation wages
as shown in Figure 1 [9J .
The aggregate supply curve as a function of expected
economic benefit (all non-monetized factors held constant)
The reservation wage is the wage or combination of wages
and benefits that are equal to the highest alternative wage
and benefit package available to an individual £7,8,10, 11 J .
Thus, reservation wage is the compensation necessary to main-
tain a person's employment, or to induce that individual







Wo = Wages and Benefits
available at a




1. The idea of the frequency distribution is
adapted from Darling [ 9 J .
2. Shaded area is cumulative number who would
reenlist at Wo, (W*<Wo)
3. The cumulative number who would not reenlist,
(W*2wo)
4. The point of indifference would be equality,
(W* = Wo) [ 7 ] .




may be generated by plotting the number of those who would
reenlist at each level of expected economic benefit,
The derivation of the supply curve in Figure 2 was
heuristic , and is for purely pedagogical purposes. Typical
non-monetized factors of the career retention decision
process of a careerist are: (1) Knowledge of the civilian
labor market [9,12] , (2) Taste for military life [13,14,15] ,
and (3) Family and spousal pressures arising out of extended
separations induced by duty [l6J . The first factor varies
according to the individual and generally has an inverse
relationship with the level of economic activity L8,13 J upon
the retention of careerists. The second and third factors
are probably the more important of the non-monetized factors
in the decision process for many careerists [14] .
The previous discussion suggests that the reenlistment
rate of career enlisted personnel may be viewed as a function
of several economic factors, with a small contribution by
the non-economic factors:
RR = f (W,R,U,C,I,D)
where
RR = Reenlistment Rate of career enlisted personnel
W = Wages expected from military service
R = Ratio of military wage to civilian wage
U = Unemployment rate in the civilian economy
C = Civilian wage that is appropriate as a reference
I = Index of wages and salaries in the civilian
economy














1. The figure was developed from ideas advanced by-
Darling [9 ] .
2. Wo is the total of wage and benefits at a point in
time that is available to the potential careerist.
FIGURE 2. Aggregate Supply Curve of Career Reenlistees
15

There are two methods of analysis commonly used in examining
the retention behavior of the careerists: (1) Survey information
,
and (2) Statistical modeling of the retention decision. Survey
data brings into view the non-monetized aspects of the decision
process, and are therefore useful. On the other hand, however,
non-monetized aspects of the decision process have been
inordinately difficult to quantify, and are not included in
the analysis in this thesis. This thesis pursues the already
quantified economic aspects of the reenlistment decision of
the careerist and develops a statistical model based upon
those factors. The task of the analysis is to develop a
valid model to explain careerists' reenlistment behavior.
Multiple regression was chosen as the technique to be used
to develop the model.
16

II. TRENDS AND IMPACTS OF CAREER ENLISTED REENLISTMENT BEHAVIOR
. ^ " ' . i !. .. ... .. - m — I - I ! -II —I I .1 I I — «.m>
No completed study was discovered that dealt with the
retention behavior of the enlisted careerist, although Binkin
and Kyriakopoulos JjL7j addressed some of the force impact
aspects of the problem of low career retention. It is under-
stood, however, that various organizations are developing
models which attempt to predict the retention impacts of
changes in military retirement programs. Studies prepared
for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed
Force £l8]] and one by Attergott £l9]] have dealt with the
factors affecting the retention behavior of first term
enlisted personnel. Parker f202 dealt with the retention
behavior of Surface Line Officers at the end of their initial
service obligation. Altergott L19J attempts to use economic
factors to describe the behavior of first term enlisted
retention behavior based upon the perceived value of
compensation. Additionally, Parker £2CQ applied the same
principles to a segment of the officer corps of the Navy
and developed a model for predicting the retention behavior
of Surface Warfare Officers. Altergott [*19]] developed a
pay elasticity to illustrate the changes in first term
retention due to a change in the military wage.
The dearth of coverage in the literature on the retention
behavior of career enlisted personnel means a most important
17

segment of the military force has been ignored. Career enlisted
personnel are those defined here as personnel with more than
seven (7) years of service (YOS) . This elimates all the first
reenlistment and first enlistment personnel, limiting this
study to personnel predominately in pay grades E-5 through E-9
.
The retention behavior of enlisted personnel making retention
decisions at the expiration of active obligated service (EAOS)
for the second or greater number of times was the focus of
this thesis.
The U.S. Navy is 43,000 men short of the number of men
required in the pay grades E-5 through E-9, based upon a
force of 460,000 personnel f2l]J . The Navy's end of year
strength in 1979 was 457,102 people, or less than one percent
short of the 460,000 amount upon which the 4 3,000 shortage
was based. Vice Admiral Robert B. Baldwin, recent Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, and
Training, indicated the Navy was 20,000 petty officers short
of the requirements for a force of 460,000 personnel £22]] .
Because of the shortage of careerists, the Navy has pursued
the manning of ships with a personnel policy euphemistically
named, "the one up and one down" ^23, 24]] . What this policy
dictates is that a job requiring a particular pay grade,
for example E-5, may be filled by a person of one higher
grade, an E-6, or a person of the lower grade, an E-4. In
very rare circumstances billets are filled with personnel
of a higher paygrade L24j . The preponderant situation is
1 8

the reverse with lower rated personnel manning billets
requiring paygrades higher than their own [2^1 . The
manning of sophisticated equipment by personnel who are lower
in operational experience and training raises serious questions
about the experience and training pool of the force.
Complicating the problem of generating sufficient numbers
of petty officers to man the ships, aircraft, and shore
facilities, is the trend of declining career retention in
the Navy |^24J , a problem which has persisted since 197 3 and
the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force. The All-Volunteer
Force was ushered in with the belief \J2.5j that the manpower
of that volunteer force would be retained at a very high
level. The retention rates, however, have been the opposite
of what was expected when the All-Volunteer Force concept
was introduced L26,27J .
TABLE 1
Career Retention, Navy ("24^]
Fiscal Years 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Career Retention 91.0 91.7 80.3 80.5 74.8 68.1 65.5 62.2
1. Careerists are the personnel who have completed more than 7 YOS.
2. The Career Retention percentage is the percentage of careerists
who reenlist of those eligible to reenlist for the second or
greater number of times.
The decline in the retention of the careerists by the Navy
not only helps explain the shortage of petty officers in the
19

Force, but it also illustrates a cause of the high number
of very junior petty officers in the Navy [[14J . The lack
of people in the career category in the Navy leaves a gap of
experience that the Navy is attempting to fill with personnel
of lower experience and training £24]J .
The experience possessed by the career petty officer is
something that must be created through years of service. The
acquisition of a first class petty officer, E-6 , requires an
average of 8.5 YOS £26]] by the service member. The recruit-
ment of more than one person to obtain one careerist E-6
is necessary because attrition rates lower the numbers of
personnel surviving the initial enlistment obligation. The
attrition rate of first term enlisted personnel in 1979 was
28 percent [6] and the first term reenlistment rate was 37
percent of those eligible [6 J . If one assumes a first term
eligible to reenlist percentage of 80 percent, which is much
higher than previous historical trends would indicate \21~\
,
the number of personnel reenlisting at the end of the first
enlistment is 21.3 per 100 initial enlistees. If one now
assumes that the future E-6 required reenlisted the first
time for four years, following an initial four year obligation,
one discovers that person must be reenlisted a second time,
on average, if the Navy is to get a new E-6. The assumption
of the second reenlistment is not unrealistic, because the
personnel in critical ratings, those with worse than normal
petty officer manning L28J , can obtain the maximum possible
20

reenlistment bonus by reenlisting for only four years
because of the way the bonus is computed Jj28]j . Thus, the
second reenlistment becomes necessary to generate the average
8.5 years of service.
The career reenlistment rate in 1979 was 62.2 percent for
the Navy, which shows that out of the original 100 personnel
2
enlisted, only 13 remained who might eventually have an
average of 8.5 YOS typical of an E-6 JJ26]J at the time of
promotion to that paygrade. As a consequence of the high
attrition rates and relatively low reenlistment rates, first
term and career, the Navy must recruit six (6) personnel, a
very conservative estimate, to obtain one first class petty
officer with 8.5 years of service.
The decline in career reenlistment rates has lowered the
experience and expertise level of the manpower of the Naval
Force. The 62.2 percent career reenlistment rate is the
lowest the Navy has experienced [2A\ and the trend during the
entire period of the All-Volunteer Force has been toward a
decreasing career reenlistment rate. If the Navy is to
2 100 initial enlistees x 0.72 (first-term attrition rate
= 0.28) = 72 remaining after the first enlistment. 72 x 0.80
(0.80 is the eligible to reenlist percentage after the first
enlistment) = 57.6 or 58. 58 x 0.37 (0.37 equals the first
term reenlistment percentage in 1979 for the Navy) = 21.46 or
21. 21 x 0.622 (0.622 equals the career reenlistment percentage
for the Navy in 1979) = 13.062 or 13. 13 personnel remain
in the Navy after two enlistments with eight years of service
with the potential to become an E-6.
21

improve its level of operations, the experience and expertise
of its personnel must be increased and maintained at very-
high levels.
Quite to the contrary, however, the readiness of the Navy
has been declining and will decline at an increasing rate
unless the experience and expertise of the personnel manning
in the Navy is improved. Admiral Hayward, CNO, stated in
testimony before Congress that:
... too many of our most talented people... continue to
vote with their feet, and the downward spiral of unit
readiness which we already find alarming will defeat our
best efforts... [29]]
The implications of shortages of career personnel in the
paygrades E-5 through E-9 are very clear. Without them the
Navy will deteriorate. The problem of poor retention is
synergistic for future retention because the shortage of
trained, experienced personnel necessitates that the remaining
personnel be pushed to work harder and to put in longer hours
L29 J • What person will voluntarily remain in a position
where the future offers only increasing work loads and hours
for pay and benefits that are not increased with the longer
harder hours?
Recently, the Navy had only six C6)_ out of thirteen (.13)
aircraft carriers and ninety-four (94). out of one hundred
fifty five C155) Naval aircraft squadrons in a combat ready
status [30 J . The overwhelming cause of the low level of
readiness was personnel shortages in the petty officer
22

billets of the level E-5 through E-9, These career enlisted
personnel are the key to keeping the Navy operating, and they
must be retained in greater numbers than has been demonstrated
over the past several years.
How did the Navy come to the current state of affairs?
The position of this paper is that the major causes of the
career personnel shortage problems in the era of the All-
Volunteer Navy have been economic. As shown in Table II the
value of pay for the E-5 through E-9 enlisted man has steadily
declined since 1973 when examined in constant 1979 dollars [3lJ,
The simple single variable linear regression of regular military
compensation (RMC) of the E-5 through E-9 personnel in constant
1979 dollars with the career retention percentage yields an
2
r value of 0.7619, which indicates a very strong relationship
between pay and career retention in the period 1971-1979 (the
career retention percentages can be found in Table I)
.
TABLE II
Career Enlisted Pay E-5 through E-9
Fiscal
Years 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Const $
RMC E-5- 1517.23 1599.98 1523.05 1445.05 1403.60 1386.71 1342.05 1282.38
E-9
1. Source of the pay schedules used in the computation: Navy Accounting
and Finance Office, Washington, D.C.
2. Constant dollar index constructed by this investigator from the index
of all services less rent from The Economic Report of the President 1980.
23

The examination of the career retention data from 1956
through 1979, using only constant dollar E-5 through E-9 found
2in Table III, RMC as a predictor, yields an r of 0..17. The
condition suggests that there is inconsistency prior to 1973
in the relationship and a tight correspondence subsequent to
that date. A major factor that distinguished 1973 from the
other years was the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in
the U.S. Military that year [[6,32 J . Conscription was no
longer used as of 1973 as a means for acquiring military
manpower. The rules governing the recruitment and retention
of manpower were changed. This thesis takes into account
the effect of the change resulting from the All-Volunteer
Force.
The decision was made through the political process [3^
to have the military acquire its manpower from the labor
market on a competitive basis with the other participants
in that market. The key word, in the acquisition of manpower
from an open labor market, is competitive. Being competitive
in the labor market requires compensation levels that are
sufficiently attractive to the potential employees in that
market to induce them to seek employment with a particular
employer. The U.S. Armed Forces are clearly, under the
all-volunteer concept, not competitive, if the retention
data for the career personnel are used as an indicator. The
retention of these personnel is an indication of the
competitive position of the military with respect to the
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1956 1136.66 1137.73 3.493 94.9 4.1
1957 1094.60 1096.12 3.341 85.8 4.3
1958 1119.66 1328.06 3.205 89.0 6.8
1959 1086.23 1268.28 3.100 90.1 5.5
1960 1054.20 1229.37 2.990 90.9 5.5
1961 1030.51 1207.58 2.918 91.0 6.7
1962 1013.87 1181.71 2.865 92.2 5.5
1963 1031.86 1334.10 2.805 93.3 5.7
1964 1032.12 1335.42 2.745 90.1 5.2
1965 1150.14 1359.05 2.676 87.3 4.5
1966 1176.76 1392.55 2.569 89.6 3.8
1967 1172.42 1390.81 2.449 80.9 3.8
1968 1169.78 1411.29 2.316 79.4 3.6
1969 1187.66 1416.85 2.152 78.4 3.5
1970 1164.02 1391.22 1.979 83.7 4.9
1971 1169.14 1400.26 1.872 90.0 5.9
1972 1264.42 1517.28 1.802 91.0 5.6
1973 1329.52 1599.98 1.727 91.7 4.9
1974 1266.49 1523.05 1.569 80.3 5.6
1975 1199.70 1445.05 1.420 80.5 8.5
1976 1163.58 1403.60 1.311 74.8 7.7
1977 1151.01 1386.71 1.215 68.1 7.0
1978 1113.07 1342.05 1.116 63.5 6.0
1979 1063.10 1282.38 1.000 62.2 4.2
Variables:
(a) E-6 means paygrade E-6, and E-6 RMC is in constant 1979
dollars.
(b) RMC means regular military compensation and Career RMC
is the arithmetic average of RMC for E-6 through E-9 in constant 1979 dollars.
(c) Wage Index means the index of all services less rent taken
from The Economic Report of the President, 1980; base 1979=100.
(d) Navy career retention rate is the percentage equal to 100 times
the number of career reenlistees divided by the number of careerists eligible
to reenlist. The Navy career retention data were supplied by M.A. Mackey of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary Military
Personnel Policy, Director of Enlisted Personnel Management at the Pentagon.
(e) Unemployment rate was taken from U.S. Department of Labor,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and is the Nationwide Unemployment rate.
25

The emphasis on economic factors in the retention of
career personnel does not deny the validity of other explan-
ations of the retention problem. Rather, it demonstrates
the strength of the economic issue when ODerating in an open
labor market that responds to the forces of economics. If
the U.S. Military, and the U.S. Navy in particular, are to
work effectively in a market economy for labor, then the
compensation levels will have to remain competitive if they
are to maintain a manpower force that is both highly
experienced and well trained.
The lack of experienced, trained personnel recently
resulted in a Navy ship in Norfolk, Va., the USS Calooshatchee
(AO-88) , being tied up, as have several ships in San Diego
J33 J . The undermanning of the ships and aircraft in all
important petty officer areas does not illustrate the full
extent of the problem. The new ships being acquired require
a higher percentage of petty officers, and trained personnel
in general, than did the units they replaced £21J . The
Navy-wide authorized level of petty officer density is 68
percent £2lJ but the present percentage is barely 62 percent.
The future holds no comfort, because the requirement for
petty officers increases as new ships are introduced. The
Ticonderoga CG-47 class ship will require a crew that is 85
percent petty officers, and the Trident Ballistic Missile
Submarines will require 91 percent petty officers in their
crews [,21J . The Navy, along with the rising requirements
26

for petty officers, faces an escalating training load due
to the more technically sophisticated equipment it has been
procuring. The Sumner DD-692 class destroyer required 63
manweeks of training investment in the crew to operate and
maintain the installed AN/SQS-23 sonar suite Jj2lJ , The
Spruance DD-963 class destroyer, replacing the Sumners,
requires 718 manweeks of training investment in the crew to
operate and maintain the AN/SQS-26 installed sonar suite £2lJ.
These are but two examples of the changes occurring in the
complexity of the hardware the Navy is procuring, intensifying
an already critical situation.
If the increasing technical complexity of the hardware is
coupled with the declining retention of the most highly trained
and experienced personnel, the situation will deteriorate
unless the career retention trend is reversed. Not only will
the readiness of the existing ships deteriorate, but there
will not be sufficient personnel to man the new ships coming
into the inventory of hardware. A situation of declining
career retention and an increased demand for petty officers
because of the petty officer higher density levels required
by the new ships, would result in a rapid decrease in the
level of readiness.
The problem of inadequate career retention must be
solved for three primary reasons: (1) Readiness has suffered,
(2) New ships require more petty officers, and (.3) The career
retention problem is synergistic: self-generating a descending
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spiral of resulting lowered retention, leading to even longer
work hours, etc. The increasing work loads and poor conditions
which result from the low and decreasing career retention will




III. UNDERSTANDING CAREER RETENTION BEHAVIOR IN THE NAVY:
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES AND PREDICTOR DEVELOPMENT
After recognizing career retention as a problem area, the
next task is to understand which factors influence career
retention. As previously stated, the position of this paper
is that economic factors play a dominant role in the retention
decision of the careerist. The first step, then, is to discover
which economic variables are effective predictors of career
retention rates.
A. PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
1. Regular Military Compensation
The first variable considered was pay in the form of
regular military compensation (RMC) . RMC is composed of basic
pay, quarters, and subsistence allowances (either in kind or
cash) , and the tax advantage on those allowances [27J . The
concept of tax advantage requires some amount of explanation.
The tax advantage accrues because the allowances portion of
RMC is not subject to income taxes L2 8J .
Binkin (.1975) assembled RMC from basic pay, basic
allowance for quarters, and special pay U-6J . The RMC
developed in this thesis was similar to Binkin' s, and was
constructed of basic pay, basic allowance for quarters (BAQ)_
,
and sea pay. After the RMC variable was constructed from the
three items (basic pay, quarters allowance, and sea pay) it
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was then computed in constant 1979 dollars, yielding a
schedule of RMC that reflects the impact of inflation upon
the RMC. Examining Table III, it is clear that beginning in
1956 the level of RMC for an E-6, on sea duty with over eight
years of service drawing BAQ, has varied considerably over
the period extending through 1979. Comparing the RMC of an
E-6 in constant dollars with the rate of career reenlistment
,
it appears there is some relationship, but it is not statis-
tically significant, as shown in Table IV.
Refining the concept of RMC in constant 1979 dollars,
a variable Career RMC was constructed by computing the RMC for
E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, and E-9s from Appendix A, and taking the
arithmetic average of the RMCs for those paygrades. The previous
discussion concluded that the career population of the Navy was
composed predominately of E-5s through E-9s, and a Career RMC
variable would, thus, more correctly describe the pay of those
careerists. The Career RMC (CRMC) was utilized for the
remainder of the analyses in this thesis.
2 . Unemployment
Another factor that could be considered by someone
making an employment decision is the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate should indicate to the potential reenlistee
something about his employment opportunities if the decision
is made to leave the service. Consequently, the unemployment
variable should be included by the careerist in his decision,
and in any analysis of retention behavior based upon economic
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variables. The unemployment rate selected was the nationwide
unemployment rate £34,35]] i anc^ is shown in Table III.
Regressing CRMC against the Navy career retention rate
yields the results contained in Table IV. The results are not
conclusive, but regression number two in Table IV indicates
that the addition of the unemployment rate does slightly
improve the ability to predict Navy Career Retention. In an
attempt to provide a better predictive relationship, additional
predictor variables were constructed.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL PREDICTORS
1. Mean Wages Nationally by Region (MWN)
A careerist making a decision of whether to remain in
the service could be observing conditions of employment and
pay of people in the area where he or she was serving, A
variable was constructed to indicate civilian pay of industrial
production workers for eleven areas of the United States where
the Navy has ships or submarines homeported: (1) San Diego,
(2) Los Angeles-Long Beach, (3) San Francisco, (4) Bremerton,
Wa., (5) Honolulu, (6) Jacksonville, Fa., (7) Charleston, S.C.,
(8) Norfolk, (9) New London (New Haven), (10)_ Newport, R.I.,
and (11) Philadelphia. Table V displays the mean wages for
those areas in unstabilized and in constant 1979 dollars using
the Wage Index developed and displayed in Table III. The mean
wage of the national regions demonstrated what a careerist
possibly could use as a reference for his potential earnings,








































y = Navy Career Retention Rate
x = Career RMC and Unemployment Rate
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 2 6.9863E+1 3.4932E+1 .384E-1. NS





Const 103. 8235 4.5109 < .01
CRMC -0. 0123 -0.7424 NS
UNEMP -0. 5753 -0.3769 NS
The regressions reported in this thesis were conducted using an interactive
program of software developed at the Naval Postgraduate School by F. Russel
Richards ^37^ . The software permits the analyst to work quickly on a data
set from an interactive computer terminal, and accomplish in minutes data
manipulations that could require many days otherwise.
Note: NS means not statistically significant
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2. Military/Civilian Pay Ratio (M/C Ratio
I
Another variable that might be related to careerist
retention rates is the ratio of CRMC to the mean wage
nationally (MWN) . For this thesis both were constructed in
constant 1979 dollars. Appendix C demonstrates the method
of construction of this variable. The mean national wage
portion of the ratio was adjusted to include the fringe
benefit percentage portion of the ratio was adjusted to
include the fringe benefit percentage portion of the civilian
salaries in order to equitably compare CRMC and mean wages
|34,35] . The CRMC variable includes the benefits of sea
pay and quarters allowance, and it was concluded that civilian
wages should be adjusted to include fringe benefits.
The ratio constructed also provides a measure of how
the pay of the military has changed relative to the pay of
the civilian labor force during the years 1956-1979. Table VI
illustrates that the pay of the careerist during the years
1956-1979 has been below the pay of the manufacturing non-
supervisory worker 13 of the 24 years. Beginning in 1967,
careerist's pay, however, was rising more rapidly than was
that of workers in the civilian sector. Military pay was
higher than civilian manufacturing non-supervisory pay until
1977, when it slipped below equality. The period of highest
relative position of military pay, 1967-1976, was also a
period of high career retention.
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Additionally, it is evident that as the ratio of pay
began declining, so also did the level of career retention in
the Navy. Viewing the data of Appendix D, it is evident that
the careerist retention rate patterns of the other services
were very similar to those in the Navy over the same time span.
3. Civilian Wages of Navy Jobs (CWNJ)
A variable was constructed to reflect the level of
wages of the civilian personnel performing the same type of
job as performed by Navy enlisted personnel. The ratings
were grouped according to the categories developed in 1979
by Chipman and Mumm Q38J , and then converted to the appropriate
civilian jobs and pay using the Occupational Conversion
Manual £39^ and Wages and Earnings, United States [.33, 34J .
Following the conversion of the Navy ratings to their closest
civilian equivalents, the civilian jobs were assigned the
salary of non-supervisory employees in that particular job.
Appendix E contains the data used in the development of the
variable, Civilian Wages of Navy Jobs. The purpose of using
the non-supervisory wage was to use the minimum wage that the
Navy careerist would be likely to receive in that civilian
job. Although it is recognized that many of the senior Navy
personnel would immediately assume supervisory positions in
the civilian sector, the decision was made to take a very
conservative position to avoid overvaluing the pay of civilian
workers. Thus, if the analysis were to err, the error would




Mean Wages Nationally For Selected Areas of Country
Mean Wages Mean Wages
Const 1979 Const 1979
Weekly Dollars Weekly Dollars
Year Waqes (MonthlyJ Year Wages (Monthly)
1956 78.34 1185.85 1968 125.76 1352.54
1957 81.18 11.75.35 1969 133.47 1244.65
1958 84.17 1168.92 1970 139.49 1196.24
1959 88.93 1194.57 1971 146.56 1188.89
1960 91.17 1181.27 1972 155.69 1215.73
1961 94.61 1196.29 1973 167.80 1255.03
1962 98.35 1221.03 1974 176.18 1197.84
1963 101.41 1202.34 1975 197.21 1212.64
1964 104.58 1244.01 1976 211.16 1206.92
1965 109.41 1268.72 1977 230.85 1215.42
1966 116.08 1292.25 1978 254.99 1233.13
1967 118.05 1252.82 1979 274.27 1188.50
Note: The wage data are for non-supervisor production employees in
manufacturing. The data were taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Tables (Wages and Earnings in U.S.)
A Comparisorl of the Ratio <
Table VI























































































The Civilian Wages of Navy Jobs (CWNJ1 variable provides
a measure of the wage level a Navy careerist could expect if he
or she were to leave the service and work in the same type of
job. The pay in similar civilian jobs would be an appropriate
reference for the careerist making a retention decision, and
should be tested to determine if it is predictive of careerist
retention rates.
4. Index of All Services Less Rent (Wage Index).
The index of all services less rent was selected
from the Economic Report of the President ^40] as being
the most representative of wages. Since the purchase of
a worker's services is very similar to the purchase of any
other service, it was felt that it represented a useful picture
of the wage changes in the nation. The Wage Index variable
in Table III was converted from Base 1967 = 1QQ to Base 1979 =
100 to permit judgment as to the movement of wages while
removing the effects of inflation. The arrangement of the
index is such that it shows a decrease in monetary value
rather than the more conventional increase in percentages.
The index can be readily converted to the conventional form
by simple arithmetic operations, but its value lies in the
aid it provides in the analysis of wage increases. The




5. Draft vs AVF
A dummy variable labeled "Draft" was constructed to
reveal if the switch from conscription to the All-Volunteer
Force was related to Navy Career Retention behavior. The
draft was considered to be an economic variable because of the
conscription tax £31j it imposed upon those who were forced to
serve under that set of circumstances. The economic cost of
conscription was borne by the inductees under conscription £32J.
The elimination of the conscription tax was one of the reasons
for the institution of the All-Volunteer Force [25j when the
AVF vs draft issue was decided.
The dummy variable for the period of the draft was
assigned a value equal to one (.1) , and a value of zero (0) for
the years of the All-Volunteer Force.
6. End Strength of the Navy
The end strength for the Navy was used to ensure that
its relationship to the retention behavior of the career force
was controlled.
7. Variations of the Unemployment Variable
a. Lag-unemployment Rate
Unemployment was lagged one year to examine whether
the careerists were making retention decisions based upon the
previous year's unemployment.
b. Lead-unemployment Rate
Unemployment was led one year and examined to
determine if there was an "anticipatory" relationship" between
career retention and unemployment.
37

c. Changes in Unemployment
The change in unemployment rate from year to year
was used to test if the change in the unemployment rate
predicted the career retention rate.
8. Other Variables Examined (Data for all of these variables
are in Appendix F)
a. Mortgage Rates
Because of the possible relationship between the
housing market and career retention, this variable was examined.
b. GNP
GNP was examined to determine if the overall state
of the economy had an influence on retention rates.
c. Net National Income
This variable was examined as a possible predictor
of general overall wage activity and economic activity.
d. Career Eligible to Reenlist
The variable was examined because it represents




A. VARIABLES FOUND TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CAREERISTS RETENTION RATES
The statistical analysis, model construction, and model
validation were accomplished using the interactive methods
described in A Users Guide to the OA 3660 Workspace Q37J .
The first efforts concentrated on varying the number of
predictor variables. Regressions with one and two predictor
variables were previously shown in Table IV.
1. Multiple Regression Results
The first extensions in the multiple regression results
used three predictor variables: (1) Career Military Com-
pensation (CRMC)
, (2) Unemployment (UNEMP) , and (.3) Wage Index.
The result of the regression analysis with these three
predictor variables is shown in Table VII. The results show
2
a very significant improvement in the R and the F-ratio over
those shown in Table IV.
Although the results shown in Table VII were considered
good, it was decided to increase the number of predictor
variables in the analysis to five.
The results in Table VIII using five predictor variables
were very encouraging.
The results of regression number one in Table VIII
2
show an R of .83 and an F-ratio of 17.336. The F-ratio is




Initial Three Variable Analysis
x = CRMC and UNEMP and Wage Index
y = Careerist Retention Navy (NAVRET)
ANOVA









CONST -12 .9224 -0.7019 NS
CRMC 0. 0423 3.9739 < .002
UNEMP 1. 3809 1.7371 < .10




Predicting Career Retention Rates Using Different Sets of Five Predictor
Variables.
Regression No. 1
x = Career RMC (CRMC) and Unemployment Rate (Unemp) and
Military/Civilian Pay Ratio (M/C Ratio) and Civilian
Wages for Navy Jobs (CWNJ) and Index of all services
less rent (Wage Index)
y = Navy Career Retention Rate (NAVRET)
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.6393E3 3..2785E2 1.7363E!






CRMC -0.063 -1.2907 NS
UNEMP 1.0871 1.218 NS
M/C RATIO 125.7459 2.0566<.05
CWNJ 0.1053 2.3455<.05
WAGE INDEX 6.4174 1.6978<.10
Regression No. 2









































x = CRMC and UNEMP and M/C Ratio
Y = NAVRET
and CWNJ and Draft
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Sauare F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.5868E3 3..1736E2 1.4560E1«













x = CRMC and UNEMP and Wage Index and M/C Ratio and Draft
y = NAVRET
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.5528E3 3..1056E2 1.3112E1«.01





CONST -9.8328 -0.5114 NS
CRMC 0.0336 1.0631 NS
UNEMP 1.5155 1.3979 NS
WAGE INDEX 12.0714 3.9478< .002
M/C RATIO 10.5198 0.2294 NS
DRAFT 3.5716 0.858 NS
Regression No. 5
x = CRMC and UNEMP and Wage Index and CWNJ and Draft
y = NAVRET
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.5714E3 3.1429E2 1.3876E:





















x = CRMC and UNEMP and M/C Ratio and MWN and Wage Index
y = NAVRET
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.5639E3 3..1278E2 1.3559E:







CONST 35.6915 0.7592 NS
CRMC 0.0683 1.4889 NS
UNEMP 1.0116 1.0173 NS
M/C RATIO -27.7817 -0.4593 NS
MWN -0.0464 -1.1119 NS
WAGE INDEX 15.4228 5.2712<<.002
Regression No. 7
X = CRMC and Draft and CWNJ and M/C Ratio and Wage Index
y = NAVRET
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.6247E3 3.•2493E2 1.6499E





DRAFT -3.274 -0.825 NS
CWNJ 0.1273 2.4491<.05
M/C RATIO 174.1895 2.8363<.02




x = CRMC and UNEMP and CWNJ and MWN and Wage Index
y = NAVRET
ANOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-Ratio
Regression 5 1.6679E3 3..3358E2 1.9291E:







UNEMP 1.1862 1.442 NS
CWNJ 0.0883 2.5089<.02
MWN -0.0828 -2.5047<.02
WAGE INDEX 11.7962 6.3402<<.002
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significance at the .01 level. These very clear indications
of progress made further refinement of the model worthwhile.
The decision was made to substitute into the regression
the dummy variable for Draft/AVF and to remove one of the
other predictors. The purpose of the substitution was two-fold.
First, it would establish if the Draft dummy variable was a
predictor with enough strength to be included in the final
model. Secondly, the substitution would eliminate weak
variables from the model.
The Draft variable was first substituted into the
analysis in regression number two of Table VIII, replacing
the Unemployment (UNEMP) variable. The regression results
were not significantly changed.
Next, the unemployment variable was reintroduced and
the Wage Index removed and replaced by the Draft dummy variable.
The results are given in regression number three of Table
VIII. The results of this change were not encouraging, with
2the statistical indicators (R
, F, and standard error! all
deteriorating, indicating that further refinement of the model
was required.
Next, the Wage Index was reintroduced and the Draft
dummy variable was substituted for the CWNJ variable in the
regression. The results are contained in regression number
four of Table VIII. The results again show deterioration,
but the changes are small. The major change was in the
significance levels of the predictor variables. The number of
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predictors that were statistically significant decreased to one.
This indicated again that continued refinement of the model
was necessary.
The next test of a five variable model was with, the
removal of the M/C Ratio and the reintroduction of the CWNJ
2
variable. The R statistic in regression number five
increased over those obtained in regression number four.
However, the most important result was the strengthening of
the t-statistic values of the predictor variables, and the
decrease in the standard error of estimate. The number of
statistically significant predictor variables was now three,
and the possible candidates for exclusion were CWNJ, and M/C
Ratio. All three of the significant predictor variables would
have to be tested later in the model development to validate
their usefulness as predictors of the Navy career retention
behavior.
The next examination of the five predictor variable
model, regression number six of Table VIII, was conducted
with the dummy (Draft) , and the Civilian Wages for Navy Jobs
(CWNJ) variables being removed and replaced by the Military/
Civilian Pay Ratio (M/C Ratio 1 and Mean Wages Nationally by
Region (MWN) variables. The results were not encouraging:
(1) The number of statistically significant predictors decreased
by two, (2) The F-ratio decreased, (3) The standard error
2increased, and (4) R decreased. The deterioration of the model
required the replacement of the variables that were removed
if improvement was to be expected.
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Regression number seven of Table VIII shows the results
of removing the Mean Wage Nationally by Region CMWN). and the
Unemployment (UNEMP) variables and their replacment by the
dummy (Draft) and Civilian Wages for Navy Jobs (CWNJJ. variables,
The results were encouraging and the statistical indicators
showed improvement in the model, with all the indicators
2improving (R , F, Predictor t-statistics, and standard error).
The final test of the five variable model was made
by removing the dummy (Draft) and Military/Civilian Pay Ratio
(M/C Ratio) variables. The deleted variables were replaced
by the Mean Wage Nationally by Region CMWN) and the Unemploy-
ment (UNEMP) variables. The results are contained in
regression number eight of Table VIII. They are encouraging
because the number of significant predictor variables increased
2from three to four. The R increased from 0..8209 to Q.8427,
with the F-ratio also rising.
The results of the five-variable model examinations
indicated that there were three candidate predictor variables
for exclusion from the final model development: CD. CWNJ,
(2) MWN, and (3) the Draft dummy. The validity of the
exclusion would have to be tested via a four variable model.
The four predictor variable models were tested and
the results are contained in Table IX. The first of the
four variable models was one containing the variables: CLI
Career RMC (CRMC)
, (2) Unemployment (UNEMP)., C3) Wage Index,




The Four Variable Model of Navy Career Retention
Regression No. 1
x = CRMC and UNEMP and Wage Index and CWNJ











































x = CRMC and UNEMP and Wage Index and MWN
y = NAVRET
ANNOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F--Ratio
Regression 4 1.5590E3 3.8976E2 1..7628E1 «.01






CRMC 0.0479 4.0869< .002
UNEMP 0.8602 0.9365 NS
WAGE INDEX 14.3615 8.1708«.002
NWN -0.0334 -1.112 NS
Regression No. 3
X = CRMC and UNEMP and Wage Index and Draft
y = NAVRET
ANNOVA
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F--Ratio
Regression 4 1.5516E3 3.8789E2 1,.7237E1 «.01






CRMC 0.0404 3.7098 < .002
UNEMP 1.6627 1.952 < .10
WAGE INDEX 12.3714 4.5919 < .002
DRAFT 3.7479 48 0.9398 NS

this test are contained in regression number one of Table IX.
2
The statistical indicators are encouraging because R only
decreased by 0.055, while the number of statistically
significant predictors was three.
The next four variable model that was tested contained:
(1) Career RMC, (2) Unemployment , (3) Wage Index, and (41 Mean
Wages Nationally by Region. The results of the test of this
variation of the four variable model are contained in regression
number two of Table IX. The statistical tests revealed that
this four variable model was not a strong candidate for
selection as the final form of the predictive model.
The final four variable model tested contained the
variables: (1) Career RMC, (2) Unemployment, (3) Wage Index,
and, (4) Draft. The statistical results of the test of the
model are contained in regression number three of Table IX.
The number of statistically significant predictor variables
2
was up from two to three. The F-ratio and R decreased
slightly.
Because of the fact that none of the four variable
models contained predictors all of which were statistically
significant, the decision was made to test a model with the
three significant predictor variables from regression three
of Table IX. The results of the analysis utilizing a three
predictor variable model are contained in Table X. All three
predictors are significant at the 0.10 level or below. Two of
the predictor variables are significant at or below the 0.002


























































































DO YOU WANT TO FORECAST A VALUE FOR Y?
ENTER X VECTOR (3 VALUES) 1282.38 4.2 1.0
FORECAST OF Y VALUE: 61.15







The most important characteristic of a predictive model
is the ability to predict accurately career retention behavior.
The interactive capabilities of the software, described in
0*7 J, permit the forecasting of new y values utilizing actual
data input as a new x-vector. The results contained in
regression number two of Table X show the results of truncat-
ing the data so that the model contains only the years
21956-1978, and 1979 data are excluded. The R decreased by
0.003. The F-ratio is, however, 21.28 which is much larger
than needed to be significant at the 0.01 level.
Utilizing actual 1979 data with the regression equation
developed using data from 1956-1979, the three variable model,
which contains: (1) Career RMC, (2) Unemployment Rate, and
(3) Wage Index, predicted Navy career retention to be 61.2
percent. The actual Navy career retention for 1979 was 62.2
percent. The actual Navy career retention for 1979 was 62.2
percent, which means the value predicted by the three vari-
able model was 98.39 percent of the actual 1979 career
retention rate.
For a clear picture of the accuracy of the three
variable model over the period 1956-1979 data in Table XI
should be reviewed. These data show that the model never
erred more than 9.45 percentage points from the actual career
retention rate. In fact, for 1979 the model is 0.755




Predicted Career Retention vs Actual Career Retention
Actual Career Predicted Career Error of the
Year Retention Retention Prediction
1956 94.9 90.78 4.11
1957 85.8 87.12 -1.32
1958 89.0 98.45 -9.45
1959 90.1 92.62 -2.52
1960 90.9 89.41 1.48
1961 91.0 89.11 1.88
1962 92.2 85.60 6.59
1963 93.3 91.47 1.82
1964 90.1 89.98 0.11
1965 87.3 89.03 -1.73
1966 89.6 87.96 1.68
1967 80.9 86.17 -5.27
1968 79.4 84.86 -5.46
1969 78.4 82.62 -4.22
1970 83.7 80.99 2.70
1971 90.0 81.23 8.76
1972 91.0 84.81 6.18
1973 91.7 86.23 5.46
1974 80.3 81.69 -1.39
1975 80.5 80.26 0.23
1976 74.8 75.85 -1.05
1977 68.1 72.79 -4.69
1978 63.5 68.11 -4.61
1979 62.2 61.44 0.75
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On the basis of the strength of the statistical indicators
and the accuracy of the forecast value, the model appears to provide
a useful predictor of Naval career retention. The model explains
77.39 percent of the variance in Navy career retention rates in
the period 1956-1979, leaving 22.61 percent of the variance
unexplained. The final form of the model is:
NAVRET = -12.9224 + 0.0423X. + 1.3809X, + 14.2789X.
where
NAVRET = Career Retention Navy (E-5 through E-9) as the
percentage of the Careerists eligible who reenlisted.
1 = Career Regular Military Compensation, E-5 to E-9
2 = Unemployment Rate Nationwide
3 = Index of All Services Less Rent (Wage Index)
developed from, The Economic Report of the
President, 1980 3 .
The Wage Index is set to Base 1979 = 1.00 and it is in the
form of a descending vs the more conventional inflating index.
The purpose of this form of construction was to permit the
investigator to deflate very quickly the value of recent pay
to the real value. For example, using Wage Index data from
Table III, it is possible to evaluate the present value of
Basic pay for an E-7 in 1957 ($273,001 in constant 1979 dollars
Performing a simple multiplication of the basic pay of an E-7
in 1957, 273.00 x 3.341, the Wage Index for 1957, yields
$912.10, the value of the E-7 Basic Pay of 1957 in constant
1979 dollars.
The sign of the regression coefficient of the Wage Index
variable appears to be counter intuitive. The sign of the
coefficient is positive, but the effect of inflation is
negative upon retention as shown in Table XII, The reason for
this is that the sign of the change in the index from 1956 to
1979 is negative, and that makes the sign of the coefficient




B. VARIABLES FOUND TO HAVE INSIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH
NAVY CAREERIST RETENTION RATES
1
.
End Strength of the Navy
The end strength of the Navy was included as a
variable in the analysis in several circumstances. The results
of the analysis to the magnitude of the multiple R statistic.
It was concluded upon the basis of this that end strength did
not help in predicting careerist retention rates.
2 Variations of the Unemployment Variable
a. Lag-unemployment rate
The lag-unemployment rate was found to have no
predictive strength in any combination where it was included;
consequently, it was deleted from consideration as a predictor
variable in the model development process.
b. Lead-unemployment
The lead-unemployment rate was found to have no
predictive strength in any combination where it was included;
consequently, it was deleted from consideration as a predictor
variable.
c. Changes in Unemployment
The change in employment rate from year to year,
when included in various combinations of other variables,
2
was observed to have a minimal effect on the R s and was not
included in the model development.
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The conclusion, based upon the variation of the
unemployment variable, was that careerists making a retention
decision apparently use a very short time horizon with respect
to unemployment conditions. The careerists would seem to use
other variables as guides in their decision. Disaggregation
of the data into occupations might yield different relationships,
however
.
3 . Other variables examined and found to have no relationship
to career retention rates :
a. Mortgage Rates
b. GNP
c. Net National Income
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL AS DEVELOPED
The development of a statistical model of career reenlist-
ment rates permits the generation of data related to the policy
aspects of the problem of low career reenlistment rates. The
model can be used to answer questions about how career
retention rates can be raised, and about the changes that
might bring about an increase in career retention.
The most obvious change that can be made is in pay, spec-
ifically CRMC. Table XII contains data generated by the model
developed in Chapter IV. The most interesting change indicated
is if pay were increased by 12.5 percent from the CRMC of
$1282 in 1979, the career retention rate would be predicted to
increase 9.3 percent over the 62.2 percent of 1979 CI. 093 x
62.2). Case three of Table XII shows the forecasted NAVRET
with a 12.5 percent CRMC increase. The strength of the
retention response to CRMC changes is less than one, with
retention changing 3.3 percent for a five percent change in
CRMC, as shown in Case one of Table XII. What this indicates
is that at a point in time the wage elasticity of the
careerists, as computed using data generated by the model for
Case one in Table XII, is 0.66. This indicates that the price
elasticity of the careerist is much less than the 1.25 estimated
by Cooper (1977) [32] for new recruits.
The implication for the policy maker of the low wage




Career Retention Forecast by the Model
Variance of
Case CRMC UNEMP Wage Index Forecast NAVRET Forecast
1. 1350 4.2 1.0 64.31 30.49
2. 1400 4.2 1.0 66.42 29.16
3. 1450 4.2 1.0 68.54 28.38
4. 1500 4.2 1.0 70.66 28.18
5. 1550 4.2 1.0 72.77 28.55
6. 1350 4.6 1.0 64.86 29.57
7. 1400 5.0 1.0 67.53 27.58
8. 1450 5.4 1.0 70.20 26.44
9. 1500 5.8 1.0 72.87 26.14
10. 1550 6.2 1.0 75.53 26.68
11. 1550 6.6 1.0 76.09 26.91
12. 1550 7.0 1.0 76.64 27.34
13. 1550 7.6 1.0 77.47 28.38
14. 1350 4.6 0.980 64.57 29.75
15. 1400 5.0 0.910 66.24 28.25
16. 1450 5.4 0.886 68.57 27.11
17. 1500 5.8 0.856 70.81 26.78
18. 1550 6.2 0.826 73.05 26.77
19. 1550 6.6 0.800 72.40 27.29
20. 1550 7.0 0.786 73.59 27.87
21. 1550 7.6 0.726 73.56 28.96
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required to reverse the decrease of the career retention rate
is very large, ceteris parabus . The careerist can be said, on
the basis of the model, to be relatively wage inelastic £7 "} .
Figure 3 shows the graph of the wage elasticity of the careerists
based upon data from Table XII; it shows the elasticity function
to be curvilinear and increasing in elasticity as the wages,
CRMC, increase.
The implication of the increasing wage elasticity is that
the careerists will be retained in accelerating numbers as
wages are increased beyond a certain point. It would appear
to be appropriate to raise the pay of the careerists suffi-
ciently, and maintain that relative position, in order to
achieve the increasing career retention.
The world in which we live, however, is very dynamic, and
never is there an opportunity to change a single variable and
hold all others constant. Consequently, it is appropriate
that the model be utilized to observe changes predicted to
occur with simultaneous manipulation of several of the
variables. In Table XII, Case number 2-13, the values of
two variables are changed, CRMC and UNEMP. The results
indicate the magnitude of the quantity response, career
retention rate change, to a change in prive, CRMC, is much
larger than is the case in the single variable manipulation.
The change in career retention, with the unemployment
rate rising to 7.6 percent and CRMC being increased by 17.3









1. Graph dipicts data generated from Cases 1-5
Table XII.
2. The data for the figure are contained in Table XIII,
3. An accurate graphic map of the wage elasticity of
the careerists would require plotting the data from
a continuous function over the range of the data.








from Table XI 64.3 66.4 68.5 70.7 72.7
Percentage Change
in Career Retention 3.3 6.4 9.2 12.1 14.5
Pay (CRMC) 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550
Percentage Change
in Pay 5.1 8.5 11.6 14.6 17.3
Resulting Wage
Elasticity .647 .753 .793 .828 .838
1. Data Taken from Table XII
2. Methodology of elasticity computation taken from PetersonQ7]
3. Case 1 percentage changes are from 1979 data: (1) CRMC = 1282, and




This indicates the wage elasticity of 1.Q5 for careerists in
times of relatively high unemployment. The policy implication
of this situation is that in periods of high unemployment, the
magnitude of the pay increases necessary to achieve a given
career retention response is smaller. The careerist becomes
more wage elastic when faced with high unemployment rates in
the civilian economy, ceteris parabus .
It is also appropriate to manipulate the three variables
in the model and observe the resulting changes in career
retention. The variables are manipulated by the same amount
in each examination of the model's predictions.
Cases 14-21 in Table XII show the responses to continued
inflation in the Wage Index. The Wage Index changes range from
two percent to 27.4 percent, representing a wide range of
possible career retention responses. The changes in the
career retention rates are very much dampened by the effects
of continued inflation of the Wage Index.
The implication of Wage Index inflation is that unless the
problems of inflation are controlled, the magnitude of pay
changes and levels of unemployment necessary to achieve an
improving career retention rate will be high. The problem of
inflation, based upon the model predictions, is depressing
4The wage elasticity of 1.05 was obtained by taking the
percentage change in career retention, 18.2, and dividing it
by the percentage change in CRMC, 17.3. The result is 1.05
or the wage elasticity under the conditions of 7.6 percent
unemployment and a pay raise of 14.5 percent.
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because changes in inflation distort the effects of changes in
the other variables. From a policy standpoint, the single
variable that would be the most desirable to control is
inflation. The absence of control over inflation will distort





The Navy in the period of the All-Volunteer Force, as
shown in Table III, has suffered a 29.5 percentage point
decrease in career retention (from 91.7 percent to 62,2 percentl
in the seven years 1973-1979. The All-Volunteer Force changed
the rules to the game, and the career personnel in the Navy
adopted the new rules readily. The three predictor variable
model developed in Chapter IV attempts to explain how the
careerists are responding to the economic factors of their
employment by the Navy. The model utilizes: CI 1 Career
Regular Military Compensation, which is the total value of
compensation (ignoring tax advantage and retirement accrual}
received by the service man, (2) Unemployment Rate, which is
the nationwide rate of unemployment as computed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and (.3) The Index of All Services
Less Rent, which is taken from The Economic Report of the
President, 1980.
The model is very accurate in its fit to the career
retention rates for 1956-1979, and may be useful for fore-
casting career retention in the future.
Additional areas of the Navy career retention question
that should be examined are: CD East Coast versus West Coast
retention rates, (2) Surface versus Air versus Submarine
retention rates, (3) Sea versus Shore assignment retention,
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(4) Retention by rating, C5) Retention by rating and paygrade
,
and (6) Retention by paygrade. The examination of the career
retention problem by utilizing data from each coast would
reveal if retention is dependent upon the coast assignment.
The examination of the career retention data by warfare
speciality would permit an understanding of the performance
of the groups with respect to the careerists. It is an
intriguing question whether career submariners are retained
in higher percentages than are surface ship or naval air
sailors. The comparisons would permit the development of
a surrogate measure of the conditions of work in the three
warfare areas.
The sea versus shore examination would explain if sea duty
makes a difference in career retention, and whether compensation
changes are required. Several studies [4lJ have indicated
that first term attrition rates are higher for personnel
assigned to shore duty.
The possibility for development of a statistical model of
career retention behavior for: (1) DOD, (.2) Army, (.3) Air
Force, and (4) Marine Corps, is very much open. The data are
contained in the appendices of this thesis. It would be of
great benefit if this research were accomplished because
it would permit a better understanding of the total force
aspect of the careerist retention problem.
Overall, the areas explored by this thesis have only been
lightly examined. All of the data and analyses reported




TABLES OF BASIC PAY, SEA PAY AND BASIC
ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS IN CONSTANT 1979 DOLLARS
A-l BASIC PAY TABLE
Source: Navy Accounting and Finance Office;
Economic Report of President 1980: Index of
all services less rent.
A- 2 SEA PAY TABLE
Source: Navy Accounting and Finance Office;
Economic Report of President 1980: Index of
all services less rent.
A- 3 BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS TABLE
Source: Navy Accounting and Finance Office
Economic Report of the President 1980: Index
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MANUFACTURING WAGES BY AREAS OF NATION
TABLE B-l MANUFACTURING WAGES BY AREAS OF NATION
Source: Employment and Earnings, United States
1909-1978, June 1980 Bulletin 1312-11
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and Occupational
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RATIO OF MILITARY TO CIVILIAN WAGES REGIONALLY
CONSTANT CONSTANT
MEAN OF 1979 $ 1979 $
FRINGE AND INDEX OF WEEKLY MONTLY
YEARS FRINGE % WEEKLY WAGE WAGES WAGES WAGES RMC/CIV
1956 .067 78.34 3.493 291.98 1265.23 .8992
1957 .072 81.18 3.341 290.75 1259.92 .8699
1958 .074 84.17 3.205 289.73 1255.49 1.0578
1959 .079 88.93 3.100 297.46 1289.00 .9839
1960 .084 91.17 2.990 295.50 1280.49 .9601
1961 .086 94.61 2.918 299.81 1299.20 .9295
1962 .091 98.35 2.865 307.41 1332.13 .8871
1963 .094 101.41 2.805 311.19 1348.50 .9893
1964 .095 104.58 2.745 314.34 1362.16 .9804
1965 .095 109.41 2.676 320.60 1389.25 .9783
1966 .103 116.08 2.569 328.93 1425.34 .9770
1967 .104 118.05 2.449 319.17 1383.08 1.0056
1968 .107 125.76 2.316 322.42 1397.18 1.0101
1969 .110 133.47 2.152 318.82 1381.56 1.0255
1970 .115 139.49 1.979 307.80 1333.79 1.0431
1971 .121 146.56 1.872 307.56 1332.75 1.0506
1972 .128 155.69 1.802 316.46 1371.35 1.1064
1973 .140 167.80 1.727 330.36 1431.57 1.1176
1974 .146 176.18 1.569 316.78 1372.73 1.1095
1975 .155 192.21 1.420 315.24 1366.06 1.0578
1976 .166 211.16 1.311 308.94 1338.75 1.0484
1977 .176 230.85 1.215 329.85 1429.34 .9702
1978 .182 254.99 1.116 336.36 1457.56 .9208
1979 .189 274.27 1.000 326.11 1413.13 .9075
Fringe benefits included to make the civilian wages reflect some of the
non-paycheck benefits as RMC does.
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MILITARY END STRENGTH 1956-1979
ARMY NAVY USMC USAF
Source: Reference Q-8J.
DOD
1956 905,711 591,996 182,971 764,541 2,445,219
1957 885,056 597,859 183,427 776,507 2,442,849
1958 792,508 563,506 172,754 735,738 2,264,506
1959 758,458 552,221 159,506 704,543 2,174,728
1960 770,112 544,040 154,242 680,639 2,149,033
1961 756,932 551,603 160,438 689,556 2,158,529
1962 948,597 584,071 173,615 746,183 2,452,466
1963 865,768 583,596 172,541 732,626 2,354,531
1964 860,514 584,700 172,567 720,372 2,338,153
1965 854,929 587,183 172,640 690,177 2,304,929
1966 1,079,682 658,635 240,911 753,477 2,732,735
1967 1,296,603 663,831 261,584 758,648 2,980,666
1968 1,401,727 673,610 282,697 761,507 3,119,541
1969 1,337,047 684,145 284,073 722,936 3,028,201
1970 1,153,013 605,899 234,706 657,402 2,651,110
1971 971,872 542,298 190,604 624,980 2,329,754
1972 686,695 510,669 178,395 599,774 1,975,533
1973 681,972 490,009 176,816 571,790 1,920,587
1974 647,466 475,479 170,062 529,067 1,849,074
1975 678,324 466,121 177,360 503,176 1,824,981
1976 680,077 460,231 171,204 479,624 1,791,136
1977 680,062 462,176 173,057 469,878 1,785,173
1978 669,515 463,217 173,427 469,862 1,775,021
1979 657,184 457,102 167,021 458,953 1,740,260
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CAREER ELIGIBLE TO REENLIST
ARMY NAVY USMC USAF DOD
1956 67,141 45,279 8,120 60,667 181,207
1957 63,198 46,409 9,873 35,057 154,537
1958 69,360 28,632 8,149 37,324 143,465
1959 51,204 15,087 6,882 38,707 111,880
1960 44,548 17,324 5,788 30,297 97,957
1961 61,945 22,553 5,758 66,679 157,935
1962 68,178 34,557 8,101 86,270 197,106
1963 59,155 32,781 8,858 63,626 164,780
1964 67,682 27,537 8,399 65,921 169,539
1965 60,208 29,108 7,698 94,147 191,161
1966 51,887 29,008 5,538 77,039 163,472
1967 53,354 35,294 6,298 58,315 153,261
1968 51,420 32,926 6,466 64,564 155,376
1969 46,395 31,156 6,818 77,906 152,275
1970 63,115 35,632 6,263 61,700 166,710
1971 79,899 32,925 7,493 52,996 173,313
1972 62,097 31,170 6,413 56,572 156,252
1973 49,133 38,647 8,053 60,855 156,688
1974 54,739 46,213 8,609 52,095 161,656
1975 53,639 42,261 9,283 56,039 161,222
1976 52,706 30,489 7,225 59,563 150,983
1977 71,278 28,785 8,433 51,706 160,202
1978 76,876 30,642 9,622 45,363 162,503
1979 81,940 29,614 15,987 44,457 171,990
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